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Estuaries, apes, and the evolution of language: a response to Perinat and Llorente
Estuaries are places on Earth where rivers join the sea. Such places 
constitute some of the most nutrient-rich and productive habitats on 
our planet. Science, just like Earth, also has its estuaries, formed not by 
waters of diverse origins but by the confluence of diverse disciplines. 
And just like Earth’s estuaries, science’s estuaries are rich, filled not 
with organic and inorganic nutrients but with vibrant ideas that 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge. The two commentaries 
that followed my article illustrate how varied and interdisciplinary our 
field has become. In just a few pages one can find ideas from ethology, 
linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, primatology, and psychology. This 
is a diversity that we have to promote and preserve, while at the same 
time engaging in a constructive dialogue. 
Adolfo Perinat offers us a timely and insightful analysis of some of the 
key ideas developed in the target article. He is right in pointing out 
that the notion of symbol used in the article is rather shallow. It only 
scratches the surface of what some linguists and philosophers understand 
by the notion of symbol. By the way, not all linguists and philosophers 
agree on what a symbol is. Nevertheless, there is no question that, for 
many of them, the conventional cultural aspect mentioned by Perinat is 
a crucial one. As far as we know, there is very little conclusive evidence 
that nonhuman apes (henceforth apes) understand symbols as social 
conventions. In fact, the motivation to share psychological states may 
represent a key cognitive difference between humans and apes (see 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).
One may object that assessing this shared component is riddled with 
empirical difficulties. This may be true to some extent but other aspects 
that we routinely observe in human infants also appear to be missing 
in apes. Apes quite readily borrow the use of human conventions, but 
do they also invent them with regularity? The answer so far seems 
to be a negative one. Such lack of inventions may indicate that their 
representational capabilities are not sufficiently developed compared to 
those of humans. Both Llorente and Perinat mentioned this aspect in 
their commentaries. Interestingly, they hold opposite views. Whereas 
Llorente argues that there is evidence of symbolic play in apes, Perinat 
finds the evidence available unconvincing. Over the years, I have come 
to appreciate the importance of this issue more and more, and it is fair 
to recognize that Perinat pointed out its significance to me many years 
ago (see Perinat, 1993). In order to clarify this point, additional data 
will be required because the anecdotal reports available on this topic, 
although informative, have little power to resolve the issue.
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The reader may be wondering at this point, why settle for a minimalist 
notion of symbol, it may simply muddle the issue up. It is true that if 
the goal was to determine whether apes use symbols as humans do, we 
should not settle for a minimalist approach. But this, in my view, is not 
the most important aspect of our endeavor. The most important use of 
comparative data is to analyze the similarities and differences among 
species and the changes that occur both during ontogeny and phylogeny. 
Apes do not have language, that much is clear, but language is not a 
monolithic structure. Instead, it is formed by multiple components. Some 
of these components are ancient and predate the time in which humans 
and all living apes shared a common ancestor, while other components 
are a relatively recent development in the human lineage. If we want to 
know how the capacity for language evolved, our closest primate living 
relatives can offer us some important clues. 
This analysis is particularly important in the light of classical ethological 
analyses of animal communication which have traditionally considered 
nonhuman communication as preprogrammed, rigid, and emotionally 
laden. Looking at it in this way, there is a rather wide and deep chiasm 
between animal communication and language (or between human and 
nonhuman thought). But is this chiasm as wide and deep as some scholars 
have proposed? Our minimalist notion of symbol has helped establish 
that ape symbolic communication is not preprogrammed, but flexible 
and emotion free. Then, what about reference and displacement? Again, 
Perinat’s analysis of the importance of intention in the sender as a key 
ingredient of reference is well-aimed. It is true that monkey vocalizations 
may not be truly intentional. In fact, it has been argued that most of 
the work in getting the message across is done by the receiver, not the 
emitter of the signals. But are all signals the same? Unlike vocalizations 
and facial expressions, the production of which individuals have little 
control over, gestures are intentional even from the emitter’s point of 
view. Means-ends dissociation, response waiting, and persistence are 
some of the features that Bates and others used as a diagnostic tool. Each 
of these criteria has been documented in ape gestural communication 
(see Call & Tomasello, 2007 for a review). The intentional nature of 
gestures is therefore well established. This should not be surprising given 
that instrumental actions often constitute the cradle of gestures, and 
there is ample evidence that apes use actions in an intentional manner, 
for instance, in problem solving situations. The prominent role that I am 
assigning to gestures fits well with Llorente’s views on the role of gestural 
communication in the evolution of language. I fully agree with Llorente 
and others that gestures (and the cognitive machinery supporting them) 
may have been crucial components for the evolution of language.
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Perhaps the emphasis on intention is mostly placed on the issue of 
its communicative goal. Here we can distinguish between informative, 
declarative, and imperative communicative intentions. Whereas 
imperatives are well-developed in apes, declaratives are rare, not to say 
inexistent -something that has been linked to the paucity of shared 
psychological states as mentioned before. With regard to informatives, 
the evidence is mixed and, as far as I am concerned, the jury is still 
out on that one. Nevertheless, the evidence that has accumulated on 
intention and goal reading in the last decade suggests that apes are not 
only guided by their own intentions but are also sensitive to others’ 
intentions (see Call & Tomasello, 2008). One crucial unresolved issue 
raised by Perinat is whether, when apes do not understand something, 
they try to understand it. In other words, would apes seek clarification 
when the message is unclear? This is an interesting and important 
question that awaits future research.
With regard to displacement, Perinat, following Hockett (1960), places 
great emphasis on future projection rather than on remembering the 
past. By the way, the evidence about the gorilla King reporting on 
past events is not anecdotal, it is based on a controlled experiment. 
Similarly, the experiments on speech comprehension in bonobos have 
appropriate controls. I do not think that dismissing those studies on the 
basis of their anecdotal nature or poor experimental control does them 
justice. Empirical rigor, however, has to be applied in both directions 
and Llorente’s use of two anecdotes of pointing in wild apes to bolster 
the existence of pointing among wild apes is also questionable. If the 
result of thousands and thousands of hours of observation is that 
pointing in wild apes has been observed twice, I think that the most 
sensible conclusion is that this behavior is extremely rare, and one 
has to wonder about its potential significance in the apes’ natural 
gestural repertoire. 
But let me return to the issue of displacement because there is indeed 
evidence that displacement may also occur in relation to future events. 
Although apes do not spontaneously announce their impending plans 
for action, they can be trained to do so. It is as if they do not possess the 
inclination to do it spontaneously but they can do it when requested. 
Granted, impending action still spans a very limited temporal frame. 
However, other recent data has shown that apes can save tools for future 
use at least of a few hours (Dufour & Sterck, 2008; Mulcahy & Call, 2006; 
Osvath & Osvath, 2008). These findings are particularly relevant given 
that Hockett precisely used the example of tool use in hominids to 
make the point about possessing an extended forward-looking temporal 
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horizon. It appears that forward-looking temporal horizons are not an 
exclusive province of human beings either.
I will finish with a conclusion and a corollary that has come with impetus 
to the surface of one of science’s estuaries. The conclusion, to reiterate the 
key message of the target article, is that artificial communicative systems 
and/or enculturation (ACS+E) neither awaken dormant capacities in apes 
nor create new ones that non-enculturated apes lack. Apes already possess 
rich cognitive processes that include attributing some psychological states 
to others and planning for future actions albeit with a more limited scope 
than humans. More likely, ACS+E allow us to have a glimpse of those 
cognitive processes and allow apes to make them public. In contrast, 
other cognitive processes such as shared intentionality or symbolic 
thought may be uniquely human. The corollary is that language is not 
needed to create those thought processes, at least those that have been 
described in apes. In fact, it may be the other way round. It is precisely 
because those processes found in apes were in place that language had 
the possibility to evolve in our human ancestors.
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